Why Al – Qaeda is claimed to be strengthening in Sahel Region.
Research by: Syed Haroon Haider Gilani
The Sahel, a vast region bordering the Sahara Desert and including the countries of Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania, is increasingly referred to by the U.S. military as “the new front in the war on terrorism”. There are enough indications, from a security perspective, to justify caution and greater Western involvement. However, the Sahel is not a hotbed of terrorist activity.
The US in the past years has enormously expanded its military presence in Africa. Under the cover of the US Neocon made ‘War on Terror’ the US military with the illegal help of murderous ‘Jackals’ – assisting the global banks and their multinationals – have abandoned a lot of military bases in Europe and Asia, and relocated them to ‘protect’ nearly all oil and natural gas resources in Africa.
http://www.thevisionfoods.com/
In this region, few things are exactly what they seem at first glance. Mauritania, which calls itself an Islamic republic, harshly suppresses Islamist activities of any kind, while Mali, a star pupil of 1990s neo-liberal democratisation, runs the greatest risk of any West African country other than Nigeria of violent Islamist activity.
With the cover of the UN for instance – the Chinese, which were not allowed to buy US Unocal in tactical revenge, have been forced to – for the most – leave the oil rich Darfur region in Sudan, for years their oil base in Africa. So called ‘Royal’ Dutch SHELL already for decades has been ‘killing and drilling’ for profit: in Africa their main victim is oil-rich Nigeria where they ‘helped’ exterminating the Ogoni people and hang famous writer and poet Ken Saro Wiwa and some of his people.
The Pan-Sahel Initiative, according to a November 7, 2002, news release by the Office of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, was “a State-led effort to assist Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in detecting and responding to suspicious movement of people and goods across and within their borders through training, equipment and cooperation. Its goals support two U.S. national security interests in Africa: waging the War on Terrorism and enhancing regional peace and security.” It was in 2005 superseded by the larger-scope Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative, which in turn was incorporated into the United States Africa Command in 2008.
The US ‘Robber Barons’ for the past years have focused on Uganda, Djibouti, Senegal and Sao Tomé y Principe, where heavily armed but flexible, small scale ‘jumping off points’ exist and more are built for the ‘oil protecting’ US ‘Rapid Deployment Forces’. The small archipelago of Sao Tomé y Principe is strategically placed in the oil rich Gulf of Guinea, sub-Saharan Africa’s major oil producing area.
The US Navy and Air Force, and collaborating states with warships, even submarines and reconnaissance air planes – like from the British & Dutch Navy – are squandering billions of the taxpayers money to surround Africa and occupy the coastal waters: ‘to protect it against Terror’. In realspeak meaning: protecting the interests of the criminal multinational Shylocks in Africa.
Sahel
The Sahel or Sahel Belt (from Arabic ساحل, sāḥil, shore, border or coast of the Sahara) is a semi-arid tropical savanna and steppe ecoregion in Africa, which forms the transition between the Sahara to the north and the slightly less arid savanna belt to the south, known as the Sudan (not to be confused with the country of the same name).
The Sahel runs 2,400 miles (3862 km) from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea in the east, in a belt that varies from several hundred to a thousand kilometers (620 miles) in width, covering an area of 3,053,200 square kilometers (1,178,800 square miles). It is a transitional ecoregion of semi-arid grasslands, savannas, steppes, and thorn shrublands lying between the wooded Sudanian savanna to the south and the Sahara to the north. The countries of the Sahel today include Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea.
Mauritania
August 4th 2005, the alarms in Washington and Tel Aviv went off at 5 ‘o’clock yesterday morning; a “Red Alert’ heralding the latest country now fighting the multinational’s interests and occupation. More will follow: as a bloody harvest of the violence the US Neocons have been sowing, and many will be killed by the people they earlier have trained to do the killing for them. Now the guns have turned around, and some chickens are coming home to roost.
The multinationals have been using the former pro-American and pro-Israel Ould Taya regime to treat the West African state of Mauritania and it’s three million inhabitants like all their other ’sources of income’ – and thus without any form of consideration or respect for anything called human rights or humanity. It’s the oil and gas wealth of Mauritania which makes the coup ‘unacceptable’ to the inhumane so called ‘New World Order’, and they’ll start to kill and destroy. How important the country and this part of the world is in the global reconfiguring of the US multinational’s energy needs which was shown during the NATO conference on 17-19 OCTOBER 2004, NOUAKCHOTT, MAURITANIA. The Mauritanians on the other hand want peace, freedom of religion and the ownership of the natural resources of Mauritania which – like in most countries – is siphoned of for the wealth of the Neocons and their multinationals.
Looking at the immediate action undertaken by the American forces and their many international and local collaborators in Africa, Mauritania will soon further be plagued by the fake US/Israeli ‘War on Terror’, resulting in the growing of the guerilla resistance in the North African and Sahel States too.
Absolutely NONE of the mainstream ‘information’ sources can be trusted. NONE whatsoever!
In the Arab world – apart from Jordan and Egypt – Mauritania was the third country which under US neocon pressure opened up diplomatic ties with Israel, (‘Holocausting’ the Palestinians doesn’t matter?) – a deed unheard of in real muslim states with which the 100% Muslim population didn’t agree. According to the Israeli information paper Ha’aretz, in a comment on the coup in 2003: ‘recognizing Israel as a state by Ould Taya was one of the main reasons for the coup.’
Mauritania in the Neocon’s profitable fold, and first to be expected, is the gathering of American/Israeli forces in the coastal waters and in the countries surrounding Mauritania, where neighboring and collaborating US-allies Niger and Morocco will play a decisive role. The small airport of Atar in central Mauritania may be used for the attack, which is bad, because I have friends living there too.
Meanwhile we can expect a lot of fake stories about ‘terrorism’ and other atrocities in the area, many times staged by the US/Israeli ‘Special Forces’ and resulting in the lies spread as ‘news’ by the followers of Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels in the usual neocon mainstream media. Especially the deceptive international propaganda megaphones one should never believe: like AP, UPI, AFP, Bloomberg, Reuters ANP, BBC, CNN, FOX etc. etc. which are linking and will continue to ‘link’ the new military rulers to ‘al Qaida’.
Ominous, and foreboding another American/Israeli holocaust of this country too, was the declaration yesterday by the US State Department, condemning the coup, interfering with the internal affairs and asking for a “peaceful return for order under the constitution and the established government of President Tai’a,”
To this blunt statement, made by US State Department spokesman Tom Casey, Washington added ”that the US would continue to deal with the old President, and sees no need for further Constitutional action.”
One must conclude that ‘unconstitutional action’ should be feared.
In Mauritania many opposition figures were arrested by former president Ould Taya’s troops, a move he explained by pointing at received US intelligence ”that al-Qaida was recruiting and training Mauritanians to fight in Iraq.” Which of course is absolute drivel and untrue, but the same dirty excuse as is used by oppressive dictators in all US supported Neocon ‘colonies’. Let us first find the wealth hidden under the soils and waters of Mauritania.
http://www.thevisionfoods.com/
Raw Materials and Oil rich Mauritania
Contrary to what happened in South America, for example, the nationalization of mines in most African countries has been limited in scope and formal in content. Many fields are still the exclusive property of the Western mining or steel enterprises which have been present for decades. The joint venture has, however, become the most prevalent form of ownership following nationalization or state participation in the capital of local mining enterprises which were full subsidiaries of foreign groups, especially Westerns.
Mauritania has extensive deposits of iron ore, which account for almost 50% of total exports. Plans to exploit the high-grade iron ore deposits at Kedia, near Zouîrât, began in 1952 with the formation of the privately owned Mauritanian Iron Mines Company (Société Anonyme des Mines de Fer de Mauritanie–MIFERMA).
MIFERMA (Societe Anonyme des Mines de Fer de Mauritanie), an iron-ore mining consortium set up by French, British, Italian and German steel capital was established when Mauretania was a source of cheap raw-materials, was being integrated through the colonial system, and through French imperialism into the world capitalist economy. With support from the World Bank, the French government, and the Mauritanian government, MIFERMA (owned by French, British, Italian, and West German steel interests) began operations in 1963 and shipped its first iron ore to Europe in 1963. MIFERMA has made enormous profits from its operations but it was not allowed by its European Owners and investors to invest these profits in more mining projects in other areas of country which might make a greater contribution to economic development.
By 1966 MIFERMA had invested the equivalent of some US$200 million in mining facilities at Kedia, port facilities at Nouadhibou, and a rail line to carry the ore to port for export. All the investment was not for the public or the country but for the infrastructure required to take the wealth of the country out to Europe.
The three surface mines at Kedia had a rich ore content of 65 percent. Mined by explosives from the sides of tall rock formations, the ore was loaded on 100-ton trucks for transport to the railhead. There, the ore was also crushed and sorted. The ore was then loaded on the world’s heaviest trains (200 cars carrying a total of 20,000 tons, pulled by four locomotives, and averaging two kilometers in length) for transport to Nouadhibou for export. Normally, there was one trip daily in each direction along the 650- kilometer line. By the mid- 1970s, iron operations consumed about 40 percent of the country’s imports of fuel oil. At the same time, mining was responsible indirectly for about 25 percent of GDP because of its high consumption of public utilities (power and water), commerce, transportation, and services.
Investment of 200 Million dollar was being converted into 200,000 dollar a day as the prices of Iron Ore were ranging between average 10 $ a ton during 1960 – 66. If we calculate daily production of 20,000 tons at average price of 8 $ per ton, the entire investment of 200 million required 25,000,000 tons, equal to the production of 1,250 days or 3.42 years. While the Iron Ore had been being export by MIFERMA for almost 11 years.
In words of “Laurie Collier Hillstrom” as the 1060s progressed, U.S. steelmakers did make significant new expenditures on their (steel manufacturing) facilities (in expensions in Productions and upgrading). From 1945 to 1959, steel prices has jumped by 165 percent. Some facts about steel market during 1960s are:
- Huge uninterrupted increase in steel demand
- Massive infrastructure and industrial capacity building in the developed nations
- Emergence of developing industrial (European and American) nations.
These facts make it obvious that how much the wealth of Mauritania was looted by Westerns and the how brutally they exploited the rights of people.
In 1974 Mauritania nationalized the mining industry as a part of its effort to establish economic independence under the second development plan. With substantial assistance from Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Mauritania bought out the European owners of MIFERMA. The Terms of Transfer of ownership to the newly formed SNIM kept the foreign expert personnel and managers on the job and maintained the supply of the Iron Ore to the former European owners of MIFERMA.
Oil in Mauritania
In 1998 Hardman Petroleum, in partnership with Dana Petroleum (operator), Woodside Petroleum and British Borneo Oil and Gas were awarded concessions offshore Mauritania. In June 2000, Dana Petroleum stated that they had identified a number of significant hydrocarbon leads in both shallow and deepwater prospects in blocks 1, 7 and 8. This is a Dana (80%), Hardman (18%) venture with a work programme that began in mid 2000 with a 4,000 to 5,000 kilometre 2D seismic survey.
The Chinguetti oilfield is an oil field located off the Mauritanian coast in 800 m water depth. It was discovered by the Australian firm Woodside Petroleum in 2001. It is named after the city of Chinguetti. It is operated by Woodside Mauritania on behalf of AGIP, Hardman Petroleum, Fusion Oil and Gas and Roc Oil. The development works under a PSC with the Mauritanian Government.
Relatively modest in size, originally estimated at 123 million barrels (19,600,000 m3), this deposit is nonetheless significant as the first commercial discovery of oil in the country, opening a new region for offshore petroleum exploration. Production of 75,000 barrels per day (11,900 m3/d) began in 2006 via an FPSO. Production declined rapidly after the start of production due to geological complexity. In November 2006 Woodside issued a statement cutting the field’s 2P reserves to 53 million barrels (8,400,000 m3). Woodside expect production of 20,000 barrels per day (3,200 m3/d) to 30,000 barrels per day (4,800 m3/d) in the next few years. The total development cost to first oil is said to be about US$750m. With today oil prices ranging 80 $ / barrel, it is value of only 9.375 million barrels of oil. Rest of about 122 million barrels is net profit which can be, according to the price of US$ 150 per barrel (2008) estimated around $ 18,300000,000 and according to current oil prices $ 9,760,000,000 while as proposed by Iranian and Venezuelan Presidents urged the prices of crude oil to be set at 200 $ a barrel inn 2008, hence if we consider it as near – future price of crude oil, the reserves can be valued at $24,600,000,000.
A smaller oil field, Tevet, was discovered in the same area in 2005, and will probably developed as a satellite – meaning that it will be exploited by wells tied back to Chinguetti’s platform. Two larger discoveries, Banda and Tiof, were also made off the coast of Mauritania, by the Woodside consortium in 2003.
In 2004, Woodside had agreed to invest US$ 600 million in developing the Chinguetti project. However, in February 2006, the Mauritanian government led by Ely Ould Mohamed Vall denounced amendments to an oil contract made by former authoritarian leader Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya with Woodside Petroleum. The controversed amendments, which Mauritanian authorities declared that they had been signed “outside the legal framework of normal practice, to the great detriment of our country”, could cost Mauritania up to $200 million a year, according to BBC News.
Since 2004, some of the world’s biggest oil companies have set their sights on Mauritania. BG, Britain’s third-largest energy company; Premier Oil, an independent; and Australian heavyweights Woodside Petroleum, Hardman Resources and ROC Oil see the small country in western Africa as a new frontier in a world where finding oil is becoming increasingly difficult.
With prices crossing $50 a barrel and touching $100 a barrel, a lack of spare capacity in the world and huge demand from the U.S. and China, the incentive to find new oil has never been greater. In the current climate, even a relatively small player such as Mauritania becomes important in helping oil companies reach their goal of replacing used reserves while cooling oil prices. But just as in Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea, Africa’s other oil-rich countries; Mauritania is not an easy place to do business.
Hardman Resources that money could be made in Mauritania. In February 2004 the company sold part of its interests to BG for $132 million, just two months after paying $33 million for it.
Ted Ellyard, managing director of Hardman Resources, says that since making its acquisition in 2003, its acreage has grown in value thanks to significant oil finds. “We had very strong interest from a number of companies in different countries, including Japan and Europe,” he said. “BG came in with the best price and there are tangible oil and gas reserves. There is probably a lot more value there than what BG paid.”
Mauritania also has reserves of natural gas. Preliminary estimates indicate the country has 1 trillion to 3 trillion cubic feet in recoverable gas reserves, the equivalent of Australia’s annual gas production. Those reserves would be enough to develop a liquefied natural gas project to supply the U.S. and Europe. But Ellyard points out that Mauritania has at least one important advantage over its competition in the gas business. “The competitive advantage would be with gas because it has a shorter transport route than Nigeria and it could supply North American markets,” he said.
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ORDINANCE 2007(full Text)
The National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), termed as most notorious act of Constitution, was issued by the former president of Pakistan General (retd) Pervez Musharraf on October 5, 2007.
http://www.thevisionfoods.com/
It granted amnesty to politicians, political workers and bureaucrats who were accused of corruption, embezzlement, money-laundering, murder and terrorism between 1st January 1986 and October 12th 1999, the time between two Martial Laws. The NRO states:
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sub-section(1), the Federal Government or a Provincial Government may, before the judgment is pronounced by a trial court, withdraw from the prosecution of any person including an absconding accused who is found to be falsely involved for political reasons or through political victimization in any case initiated between 1st day of January, 1986 to 12th day of October, 1999 and upon such withdrawal clause (a) and clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall apply.”
The current Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, suspended this ordinance on October 12, 2007. But he was soon dismissed after Musharraf abrogated the constitution on November 3, 2007. The new Chief Justice, Abdul Hameed Dogar revived the NRO on February 27, 2008. Let us have details of it below;
AN ORDINANCE to promote national reconciliation
[Source: Text obtained from Associated Press of Pakistan website. http://www.app.com.pk/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18069&Itemid=2 on October 5, 2007. Converted to pakistani.org xml format and converted to html using pakistani.org xsl by Shehzaad Nakhoda.]
WHEREAS it is expedient to promote national reconciliation, foster mutual trust and confidence amongst holders of public office and remove the vestiges of political vendetta and victimization, to make the election process more transparent and to amend certain laws for that purpose and for matters connected therewith and ancillary thereto;-
AND WHEREAS the National Assembly is not in session and the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action;
NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 89 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the President is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance;-
| 1. | Short title and commencement.
|
||||||||||||||
| 2. | Amendment of section 494, Act V of 1898. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), section 494 shall be renumbered as sub-section (1) thereof and after sub-section (1) renumbered as aforesaid, the following sub-section (2) and (3) shall be added, namely:-
|
||||||||||||||
| 3. | Amendment of section 39, Act LXXXV of 1976. (1) In the Representation of the People Act, 1976 (LXXXV of 1976), in section 39, after sub-section (6), the following new sub-section (7) shall be added, namely:-
|
||||||||||||||
| 4. | Amendment of section 18, Ordinance XVIII of 1999. In the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (XVIII of 1999), hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance, in section 18, in clause (e), for the full stop at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be added, namely:-Provided that no sitting member of Parliament or a Provincial Assembly shall be arrested without taking into consideration the recommendations of the Special Parliamentary Committee on Ethics referred to in clause (aa) or Special Committee of the Provincial Assembly on Ethics referred to in clause (aaa) of section 24, respectively. |
||||||||||||||
| 5. | Amendment of section 24, Ordinance XVIII of 1999. In the said ordinance, in section 24,-
|
||||||||||||||
| 6. | Amendment of section 31A, Ordinance XVIII of 1999. In the said Ordinance, in section 31A, in clause (a), for the full stop at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following new clause (aa) shall be inserted, namely:-
|
||||||||||||||
| 7. | Insertion of new section, Ordinance, XVIII of 1999. In the said Ordinance, after section 33, the following new section shall be inserted, namely:-
|
||||||||||||||
Corruption cases against President Zardari set to reopen
LAHORE: Over 100 corruption and criminal cases involving important Pakistani politicians including President Asif Zardari, which had been settled earlier under a controversial presidential ordinance promulgated by Musharraf in February 2008, would automatically reopen on November 28, thus creating more problems for an already embattled Pakistani President.
Not only President Asif Ali Zardari but most of his confidants and top political and bureaucratic aides had benefited from the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) which President General Pervez Musharraf had promulgated before the 2008 general elections on February 2, 2008 to allow many top politicians to take part in the elections. However, the recent decision of Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani under the opposition parties’ pressure not to enact the NRO with effect from February 2, 2008, would automatically reopen all the cases which had been settled after that date as per a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
After a high level meeting of the ruling alliance at the Presidency on November 4, 2009, the PPP government decided not to bring the ever-controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance to the parliament for a vote. This is clearly a reversal on the part of the government but one which could have been avoided had the ruling party consulted its allies beforehand. It is quite apparent that the NRO as a bill was brought to the relevant committee of the National Assembly without even making sure that all the numbers needed were in hand.
According to analysts, the withdrawal will not put an end to the dangers that the NRO represented to the map of power brought about by the 2008 elections. After the debacle caused by an aggressive withdrawal of the PPP’s major allied party Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) from the pro-NRO consensus, the next crisis in the offing is the march of the opposition to a no-confidence vote. The Sharif-led PML-N, whose chief had threatened to start a Long March against the NRO, is no longer averse to the thought of a mid-term change, whether through a new general election or through the ‘minus-one’ formula under a ‘national government’, possibly with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani in the driving seat.
On March 5, 2008, five cases (ref Nos 14/2001, 6/2000, 13/2001, 41/2001 and 23/2000) against President Asif Ali Zardari were closed down. These cases ware about assets beyond known source of income, illegal construction of a polo ground at the Prim e Minister’s House and loss of national exchequer, alleged corruption and corrupt practices in the Green Tractor scheme, corruption and corrupt practices in the SGS case and corruption and corrupt practices in the ARY Gold case. Between 1988 and 1996, Zardari played a key if often behind the scenes role during the premiership of Benazir Bhutto; and became a victim of an alleged revenge campaign during Nawaz Sharif’s stay in Islamabad as Premier. Zardari served as a Member of the National Assembly twice (1990-1993 and 1993-1996) and was appointed the Federal Minister for Environment as well as Minister for Investment during that period. But many political analysts saw him as a liability for his wife, and the PPP.
Zardari has spent almost 11 years in prison for charges ranging from corruption to murder, in spite of not being convicted in any of them. And all these cases were eventually withdrawn in February 2008 under the NRO, thus paving way for him to become the Pakistani President in place of Musharraf.
amir.mir1969@gmail.com
Billions in US aid never reached Pakistan army
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — The United States has long suspected that much of the billions of dollars it has sent Pakistan to battle militants has been diverted to the domestic economy and other causes, such as fighting India. Now the scope and longevity of the misuse is becoming clear: Between 2002 and 2008, while al-Qaida regrouped, only $500 million of the $6.6 billion in American aid actually made it to the Pakistani military, two army generals tell The Associated Press.
www.thevisionfoods.com
The account of the generals, who asked to remain anonymous because military rules forbid them from speaking publicly, was backed up by other retired and active generals, former bureaucrats and government ministers. At the time of the siphoning, Pervez Musharraf, a Washington ally, served as both chief of staff and president, making it easier to divert money intended for the military to bolster his sagging image at home through economic subsidies.
“The army itself got very little,” said retired Gen. Mahmud Durrani, who was Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S. under Musharraf. “It went to things like subsidies, which is why everything looked hunky-dory. The military was financing the war on terror out of its own budget.”
Generals and ministers say the diversion of the money hurt the military in very real ways:
- Helicopters critical to the battle in rugged border regions were not available. At one point in 2007, more than 200 soldiers were trapped by insurgents in the tribal regions without a helicopter lift to rescue them.
- The limited night vision equipment given to the army was taken away every three months for inventory and returned three weeks later.
- Equipment was broken, and training was lacking. It was not until 2007 that money was given to the Frontier Corps, the front-line force, for training.
The details on misuse of American aid come as Washington again promises Pakistan money. Legislation to triple general aid to Pakistan cleared Congress last week. The legislation also authorizes “such sums as are necessary” for military assistance to Pakistan, upon several conditions. The conditions include certification that Pakistan is cooperating in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons, that Pakistan is making a sustained commitment to combating terrorist groups and that Pakistan security forces are not subverting the country’s political or judicial processes.
The U.S. is also insisting on more accountability for reimbursing money spent. For example, Pakistan is still waiting for $1.7 billion for which it has billed the United States under a Coalition Support Fund to reimburse allies for money spent on the war on terror. But the U.S. still can’t follow what happens to the money it doles out.
“We don’t have a mechanism for tracking the money after we have given it to them,” Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Mark Wright said in a telephone interview. Musharraf’s spokesman, retired Gen. Rashid Quereshi, flatly denied that his former boss had shortchanged the army. He did not address the specific charges. “He has answered these questions. He has answered all the questions,” the spokesman said. Musharraf took power in a bloodless coup in 1999 and resigned in August 2008.
The misuse of funding helps to explain how al-Qaida, dismantled in Afghanistan in 2001, was able to regroup, grow and take on the weak Pakistani army. Even today, the army complains of inadequate equipment to battle Taliban entrenched in tribal regions. For its part, Washington did not ask many questions of a leader, Musharraf, whom it considered an ally, according to a U.S. Government Accountability Office report released last year.
Pakistan has received more money from the fund than any other nation. It is also the least expensive war front. The amount the U.S. spends per soldier per month is just $928, compared with $76,870 in Afghanistan and $85,640 in Iraq. Yet by 2008, the United States had provided Pakistan with $8.6 billion in military money, and more than $12 billion in all.
“The army was sending in the bills,” said one general who asked not to be identified because it is against military rules to speak publicly. “The army was taking from its coffers to pay for the war effort — the access roads construction, the fuel, everything. … This is the reality — the army got peanuts.”
Some of the money from the U.S. even went to buying weapons from the United States better suited to fighting India than in the border regions of Afghanistan — armor-piercing tow missiles, sophisticated surveillance equipment, air-to-air missiles, maritime patrol aircraft, anti-ship missiles and F-16 fighter aircraft.
“Pakistan insisted and America agreed. Pakistan said we also have a threat from other sources,” Durrani said, referring to India, “and we have to strengthen our overall capacity. “The money was used to buy and support capability against India.”
The army also suffered from mismanagement, Durrani said. As an example, he cited Pakistani attempts to buy badly needed attack helicopters.
Pakistan asked for Cobra helicopters because it knows how to maintain them, he said. But the helicopters were old, and to make them battle-ready, the Pentagon sent them to a company that had no experience with Cobras and took two years, he said.
As a result, in 2007, Pakistan had only one working helicopter — a debilitating handicap in the battle against insurgents who hide, train and attack from the hulking mountains that run like a seam along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
The army was also frustrated about not getting more money. Military spokesman Gen. Athar Abbas said the U.S. gave nothing to offset the cost of Pakistan’s dead and wounded in the war on terror. He estimated 1,800 Pakistani soldiers had been killed since 2003 and 4,800 more wounded, most of them seriously. The hospital and rehabilitation costs for the wounded have come to more than $25 million, Abbas said. Pakistan’s military also gives land to the widows of the dead, educates their children and provides health care.
“These costs do not appear anywhere,” he said. “There is no U.S. compensation for the casualties, assistance with aid to the grieving families.”
Even while money was being siphoned off for other purposes on Pakistan’s end, the U.S. imposed little control over or even had specific knowledge of what went where, according to reports by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. The reports covered 2002 through 2008.
The reports found that the Pentagon often ignored its own oversight rules, didn’t get adequate documents and doled out money without asking for an explanation. For more than a year, the Pentagon paid Pakistan’s navy $19,000 a month per vehicle just for repair costs on a fleet of fewer than 20 vehicles. Monthly food bills doubled for no apparent reason, and for a year the Pentagon paid the bills without checking, according to the report.
Daniyal Aziz, a minister in Musharraf’s government, said he warned U.S. officials that the money they were giving his government was being misused, but to no avail.”They both deserved each other, Musharraf and the Americans,” he said.
A review of export of IRRI 6 during 1999 – 2009
By: Syed Haroon Haider Gilani
www.thevisionfoods.com
After wheat, rice is the most important food grain crop of Pakistan and is the major foreign exchange earner. Rice occupies about 11% of the total cropped area in the country, yielded 5024.8 thousand tons from area of 2519.6 thousand hectares during 2004-05 (GOP, 2005-06). Pakistan contributes about 11% in total world rice export and on an average 1/3rd of the total national rice production is exported every year which accounts for 5.7% of the total value added in agriculture and 1.3% to GDP.
1999 – 2000 crop season
In 1999, The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) has estimated that the global output of rice was 535 million tonne and by the year 2025, the world’s demand for rice is likely to rise to 880 million tonne. Rice crop was second to cotton as foreign exchange earner In 1997-98, Pakistan exported rice worth over US$550 million and all-out efforts were being made to increase the export to $700 million and first then to one billion. It was not difficult to achieve these targets provided with increase per acre yield and improvement in the quality of exportable rice.
To improve the quality and sale at high price per unit, the Government had made some structural and administrative changes in monitoring the purity of exportable rice. These changes involved analysis of rice of different varieties by the Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan (REACP) and fixing the minimum export price. The REAP had proved its performance by checking the quality of brown rice exported to Europe in 1996-97. The confidence of rice importers in quality of Pakistani rice was gradually building up and exports were steadily increasing.
Just before the arrival of new crop 1999 – 2000, traders and exporters were worried due to the weak demand and arrival of supplies of fresh crop to hurt the prices of irri 6 rice in October 1999. Domestic prices of the IRRI-6 variety had fallen sharply in next days as the new crop had arrived while there was no improvement in demand. Pakistani exporters had cut their prices but there was no demand at that moment in International Market. The volume of Irri-6 rice exports from Pakistan has declined in 2000 by 50 percent, leaving the rice millers and growers in trouble. Market sources attributed the fall in exports to the poor quality. Total Irri-6 production was estimated at about 2.6 million tonnes per annum. Of this about 1.2 million tonnes were exported. That year only 0.6 million tonnes had been exported.
In March 2000, Iran has offered to import a further 60,000 tonnes of Irri-9 rice from Pakistan. The government of Iran made this offer during a visit to Iran of Pakistani Commerce Minister Razaak Dawood. The government of Iran had made the offer over and above its kW agreement with Trading Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) for the import of 15,000 tonnes of Irri-9 cargo. That deal was closed at $229 per ton FOB Karachi, during the visit of a Pakistani delegation in the second week of January 2000. Also in Late March 2000, Rice exporters were fearing cancellation of Indonesian tender, issued last month for 50,000 tonnes of Irri-6. A leading rice exporter said that the time for opening of letter of credit (L/C) was due for March shipment this year, but 22 days have passed and no intimation has been made to the winner of the tender. Also international prices of Irri-6 had declined to $ 160 per tonne FOB and at this price export was not be feasible as Pakistani exporters could not compete with Chinese or Vietnamese who are selling quality rice at lower prices.
June 2000, The price of Pakistani rice rose in early June as fresh buying emerged due to a rice deal with Bangladesh and two overdue orders for Indonesia. However, foreign demand was still slow since Pakistan was quoting much higher prices than China. There had been a bit of activity because of a 12,000-tonne order from Bangladesh for Irri-6. By the time, Pakistan was holding about 400,000 tons of Irri-6 rice from the on-going season’s exportable surplus of 1.2 million tons. At the prevailing world market rate of about $150 a ton, the export value of rice stood at about $60 million. With only three months left for the start of next paddy season in October, growers and millers who were holding most of the rice were likely to be in a poor financial position to meet their input cost for the new crop.
2000 – 01 crop season
In December 2000, it was discussed at a meeting of Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan (REAP), chaired by the Export Promotion Bureau Chief that Pakistan would adopt a ‘country-specific strategy’ to achieve rice export target of US$630 million for the fiscal year which stood at $539 million during the year 1999-2000.
Pakistan’s rice exports to Afghanistan and Iran have been estimated at 13,264 tonnes during the current season between July to November 2000. For the first five months of fiscal 2000 – 01, the value for the export stood at more than Rs 94.699 million (US$1.63 million). Pakistan has exported 1.636 million metric tonnes rice worth more than US$358.7 million during July-April of the fiscal year 2000 – 2001. The export of Irri-6 was recorded at 1.125 million tonnes during the fiscal and the export of Irri-9 stood at 83,549 tonnes, during the same period. While rice crops had been severely damaged in traditional ‘rice bowl’ countries including Vietnam and other countries, farmers in Pakistan harvested for the second consecutive year bumper crop of around 2.2 to 2.4 in tons Irri-6 and Irri-9. The country was expected to have an exportable surplus of around 1.3 to 1.5 million tons after meeting domestic consumption of about 0.8 million tons to one million tons.
February 2001, Pakistan rice exporters had slashed export prices for the IRRI-6 rice variety to increase their share of the international market. In last week of February 2001, Pakistani traders were offering at $US73.01 a tonne compared to $144 last week in a bid to thwart cheaper rates offered by key rival Thailand. But there was pressure to further reduce the rates. International buyers were asking Pakistani exporters of rice to reduce prices. A major development was that , according to (then) Pakistan’s State Minister and Chairman Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) Tariq Ikram, Iraqi government had increased the quantity of Pakistani Irri-6 rice purchase from 24,000 tonnes to 40,000 tonnes along with its international tender for supply of Pakistani wheat from 37,000 tonnes to 100,000 tonnes.
March 2001, A four-member team of Pakistan’s leading rice exporters was expected to leave for Manila to participate in the 100,000 tonnes white rice tender floated by National Food Authority (NFA) of Philippines. Rice exporter’s delegation was waiting for a green signal from Pakistani Embassy in Philippines to leave for Manila. National Food Authority (NFA) of Philippines had floated a tender for supply of 100,000 IRRI-6 long grain white rice, allowing only China, Vietnam and Thailand to closing, date of March 8 2001. Meanwhile, Trading Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) had asked Pakistani Embassy in Manila to immediately approach and to request Philippines government to allow Pakistan to participate in the bidding of 100000 tonnes of IRRI-6 rice.
May 2001, Rice prices in Pakistan had risen due to diminishing stocks and fears that the next crop would be delayed due to irrigation water shortages. Prices were on a bullish path as traders feared further delay in the arrival of the new crop and that was pushing them to hold back their stocks in the hope prices would increase further. Usual local demand had been boosted by exporters buying to meet their commitments. Prices of 100-kg bags of IRRI-6 varieties on the local market had moved up 30-35%. The high domestic prices were creating problems for exporters seeking to compete on the international market. Pakistan was quoting export prices of US$138/$140 per tonne against Vietnam’s US$123/$124 per tonne for the same variety of IRRI-6 rice.
2001 – 02 crop season
With the beginning of 2001 – 02 season in October 2001, it was feared that Pakistan would only be able to export about 40,000 tons from new crop Irri-6 rice in the new crop season that started on November 1, compared to 120,000 tons in the corresponding period previous year. Due to a steep fall in the export of Irri-6 rice, which brings in an average price of $177 per ton, the country has earned $7.8 million only as against previous year’s of around $21 million. Exports of rice from Pakistan had been not been affected by US air strikes over Afghanistan, according to our trade and shipment sources. Pakistan’s rice export has declined by 7.56 per cent to 651,262 tons during first six months of the current fiscal year. According to rice exporters in Karachi, the value of exported rice had also declined by 5.48 per cent to $174.926 million during July-December 2001. Previous year, Pakistan exported about 704,537 tons worth $185.074 million during the same period. According to rice exporters the reason for decline in overall rice export was drop in the export of Irri-6 due to price cut by China.
There had been a rush of shipments at the port and exporters were eager to load their consignments. A cargo vessel, Trade Fast, which had berthed at Karachi port in mid of October, had been flooded with rice consignments. The departure of the ship had been delayed for a day, due to technical problems. An earlier ship had been missed by rice exporters and, therefore, pending consignments were being loaded on Trade Fast.
In November 2001, Export of new crop rice having an estimated value between US$350 to $400 million in the world market was in doldrums as exporters were reluctant to enter into foreign contracts owing to highly volatile dollar/rupee parity. After 1 October’s free fall of dollar against the rupee when the dollar on a single day shed 140 paisa – or more than 2 per cent of its value in open market and threw off 50 paisa or about 0.8 per cent of its value in the inter-bank market, the parity between both currencies thereafter remained highly volatile. Despite the fact the dollar had made some recovery on Oct 24 at Rs61.70/61.80, on the very next day it fell to Rs61.45/61.55 for buying/selling respectively, the lowest level of the month. But on Oct 29, it again recovered to Rs61.65/61.75 for buying and selling against the rupee, respectively.
The Rice Exporters’ Association of Pakistan (REAP) sources said that the main factor for slow exports would be highly volatile dollar/rupee parity as well as War Risk Premium (WRP). “How could we compete in the world market if we have to include $5 per ton as WRP in our cost,” said the chairman REAP Abdul Rahim Janoo. Rice exporters were unable to enter into new deals with foreign buyers because of rapid fluctuation in dollar/rupee value and at the same time, demand from African countries has diminished. In last week of November, Sri Lanka has temporarily waived the import duty on rice and has issued licenses for the import of 33,000 tons of Irri-6 rice, having a shipment schedule up to December 10, 2001. In the past, Pakistan had been a major supplier of coarse rice to Sri Lanka, but with a bumper paddy crop in Sri Lanka during 2000-01 and an import duty of 35 per cent no export of Irri-6 took place.
During January 2002, International Rice prices, according to Jackson Son & Co, London, cash f.o.b. prices for Thailand parboiled 25 per cent broken rice is $156 per tonne, while for Vietnam 25 per cent broken it is $185. In case of India and Pakistan, parboiled IRRI-6 25 per cent broken is $128 and $145 respectively. During July-January 2001-2002, rice export volume dropped by 19.53 per cent or 186,911 tonnes to 770,361 tonnes against 957,272 tonnes during the same period last year. Pakistan was not be able to sell rice due to severe competition from India and Burma who are suppressing the market by selling rice at very low prices. The decline in the export of IRRI-6 has significantly contributed in the decline of overall rice export of the country.
Pakistan’s rice export had declined by 23 per cent or $52.86 million to $233.24 million during the first eight months of the fiscal year 2001-2002. According to export statistics, Pakistan’s rice exports stood at $288.11 million during July-February 2000-2001. During July-February 2001-2002, rice export dropped by 26.48 per cent or 310,189 tonnes to 887,072 tonnes in volume against 1.197 million tonnes during the same period previous year. President of the Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan (REAP) Rahim Janoo told APP that country’s rice exports have declined due to shortage of Irri-6 and basmati in the local market and appreciation of Pak rupee. Rice exporters were in a classic catch-22 situation. After securing the right to bid in the Philippines’ next rice import tender for the first time in six years, they found rice prices at home too high and the staple in short supply.
“Our prices are very high and we have no rice to export…it’s a lost opportunity,” Haji Majeed, a rice exporter. The situation was a blow for exporters, who were struggling to make inroads into the world rice trade, particularly in the Philippines, one of the largest rice importers in Asia resulting the value of Pakistan’s rice exports fell by 20 per cent or US$67.1 million to about $266.68 million during the first nine months of the fiscal year 2001 – 02. According to statistics, Pakistan’s rice export was estimated at $333.68 million during July-March 2000-2001.
During April 2002, In volume, rice export dropped by 29.75 per cent or 428,317 metric tons to 1.011 million tonnes during July-March 2001-2002 against 1.439 million tonnes during the same period previous year. Again the rice export had declined due to appreciation of the rupee against world’s most currencies and shortage of Irri-6 and Basmati varieties in the local market. The export of Irri-6 showed a shortfall of 429531 tonnes to 597463 tonnes during nine months of the current fiscal, compared to 1.026 million tonnes during the same period last year. Pakistan fetched an average price of $154 a tonne for Irri-6 during the period under review.
Exporters were of the opinion that Indian rice exporters had thrust their way into the world market by elbowing out Pakistani exporters, who were confronted with numerous problems that came in their way in making viable export contracts. According to reports appeared in Indian media, the Pakistani exporters were losing market share in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia to rival India, where rice prices were significantly lower and the government had also lifted all restrictions on export of all food grains, including rice and wheat. Consequently, Pakistan after exporting 1.439 million tons of rice last year (July-March) had to witness a drastic fall of 29.8 per cent in over all rice exports this year (July-March) on exporting 1.011 million tons only. The fob price earned during nine months (July-March) through export of rice stood at $266.682 million as against $333.786 million fetched in the corresponding period previous year. This showed a fall of 20.1 per cent or $67.11 million less in foreign exchange earnings.
Mr. Zulfikar Thaver, convener of Union of Small and Medium Enterprises (USME), elaborated the problems that India was giving 18.75 per cent subsidy on export of every kilogramme of rice. As a result of indifferent attitude of the government, export of Irri-6 during the last nine months (July-March) declined by 41.9 per cent at 0.597 million tons as against 1.027 million tons recorded during the corresponding period last year. He said there was no logic to ban the cultivation of 386 (non-Basmati) rice and some other varieties which were fast growing and mostly used for blending with other superior varieties to meet buyer’s price constraint. “When India can export ‘Pusha Sherbati’ varieties under basmati then the 386 variety, which is much superior, could also be used for blending,” he added.
In May 2002, Pakistani rice exports were likely to fall to US$400 million mark during the fiscal year due to continued world recession after September 11 incidents. Only two months had been left in the fiscal year and the total rice export was estimated at only $363.61 million during the last 10 months. During 2000-2001, Pakistan exported rice worth $526 million. The Chairman of Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan (REAP) Mr. Abdul Rahim Janoo in media report said that prices in the local market were very high while in the international market they were on the lower side this year. There is hardly any demand for Pakistani IRRI-6 and IRRI-9 due to high prices, he added. He pointed out that Vietnam, China and India are capturing market due to their lower prices. “The unit price of basmati is also good and we will be able to export about 600000 tonnes this year to compensate the losses of IRRI-6″, he hoped. Pakistan exported 1.387 million tonnes of rice during July-April 2001-2002, compared to 1.937 million tonnes during the same period previous fiscal.
2002 – 03 crop season
In July 2002, The less production of Irri-6 and Irri-9 rice besides a low demand of Pakistani rice in the African countries has declined its export about $ 84 million. The depleting stocks of rice in the country had marred the exports of rice as in first two months (July-August 2002) of fiscal 2002-03, it declined by 26.47 per cent. However, the rice exporters fetched better unit price on all varieties of rice exported from July 1, to August 24 to various countries, including UAE, Muscat, Bahrain, USA, UK, etc.
The total quantity exported from Karachi stood at 123,353.587 tonnes worth US$43,954,880.06 (FOB price) against 48,533,186.41 tonnes of previous year, short by 44,408 tonnes. “Despite shortage of rice stock in the country we are lucky because our prices in international market have improved as compared with our main competitors, India etc. The prices of all varieties have soared up by manifolds”, said Rice Exporters Association of Pakistan (Reap) Chairman Abdul Rahim Janoo to Media. He said the average unit price of Super Basmati rose to US$570 from US$554.69 received from the international buyers last year. Besides, the prices of other varieties, including Basmati-385, blended rice, Irri-9, Irri-6 and Pk-386 soared substantially. “But due to shortage of stock it is feared apprehended that Pakistan.
During 2002 – 03, There had been very limited exports due to higher prices. Short supplies had raised export prices to $178-$180 a metric tonne, compared with $164/tonne in India. Country’s rice export had surged by 13 per cent to $627.214 million (1 $ = 58.96 Rs) during 2003-2004, breaking all previous records of rice exports. Rice export had also surpassed the export target of $600 million for 2003-2004. After harvesting bumper paddy crop of 5.5 million tons the country was then poised to make a record export worth over $1 billion owing to larger surplus quantity and better prices being fetched for the season 2005-06 crop.
To be continued………..
IRRI – 6 (MEHRAN 69) White Long Grain Rice
Research by:
Syed Haroon Haider Gilani
Rice in Pakistan
www.thevisionfoods.com
In Pakistan, Rice is an important food and cash crop, which is cultivated under diverse climate and it is the third largest crop after wheat and cotton. Rice, a highly valued cash crop, is grown over 10% of total area under cultivation in Pakistan, covering an area of 2.1 million hectares of which 1.1 million ha is in Punjab while remaining 1 million ha in other three provinces of Pakistan. Rice accounts for 5.5 – 6.1 % of valued added in agriculture and 1.1 – 1.3% in GDP. Basmati and non Basmati Rice are the two main types of rice grown in Pakistan. In 1947, the area under rice in Pakistan was arounds 8,56,000 hectares which in 1998 reached or 2.4 million hectares. The rice production during this period increased from 737,000 to 4.6 million tonne. Thus area increased by 3 times, but the production increased by 6 times. Although, increased area contributed to increased production but significant increase in per acre yield was brought about by the development of high yielding varieties, improved agronomic practices supported with fertilizers and plant protection measures.
Non Basmati Rice is majorly cultivated in Sindh, which comprises 44% of total rice production in Pakistan and Southern Punjab with IRRI varieties including IRRI-6 (Mehran 96) and IRRI-9 which are aimed for export only to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, (largest importers of IRRI Rice from Pakistan),Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, West and North African region.
Although rice has a relatively low protein content i.e. about 8% in brown rice and 7% in milled rice versus 10 percent in wheat, brown rice (caryopsis) ranks higher than wheat in available carbohydrates, digestible energy (kilojoules [kJ] per 100 grams), and net protein utilization (NPU). Rice protein is superior in lysine content to wheat, corn, and sorghum. Milled rice has lower crude fiber content than any other cereal, therefore; it makes rice powder suitable for infant food. Although rice is low in riboflavin and thiamine (vitamin) but its carbohydrate and protein percentage available is sufficient to sustain the energy needs for an adult whereas, for growing children, rice needs to be supplemented by other protein sources (Hegsted, 1969; Juliano, 1985).
Rice has been rightly considered as the queen among cereals for its nutritional quality and higher digestibility. In Pakistan two types of rice i.e. coarse and fine varieties are grown. The fine varieties of rice possess a specific aroma characteristic and cooking characteristics due to which these are very much liked all over the world and fetches higher price in the market.
IRRI – 6: History of research, development and cultivation in Pakistan
Historically rice research in Pakistan was initiated in 1912 with the establishment of Agri. Research Station at Larkana,Sindh. However, rice varietal improvement was started in 1920. In 1938 Rice Research Station was established atDokri, Sindh and then station was upgraded to institute in 1970. In Punjab, rice research was initiated in 1926 with the establishment of Rice Research Station, Kala Shah Kaku. The station was upgraded into a mono-crop, multidisciplinary institute with a wider mandate in 1970. In NWFP, rice varietal improvement work was started at Agri. Research Institute, Tarnab, Peshawar in 1962. In 1964, rice research was shifted to Mansehra and D. I. Khan and then from Mansehra to Mingora Swat in 1975.
Keeping in view the production problems of rice growers in diverse climatic zones, several rice research facilities were opened in other areas. A National Coordinated Research Programme (NCRP) on rice was initiated in 1975. Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC) acts as coordinating agency and integrates the research activities with a full time National Coordinator. The overall objective was to strengthen and coordinate rice related research and development activities in the country. Since 1975 NCRP on rice has been playing a vital role in rice improvement with the collaboration of its units.
Rice Research Institute (RRI), Kala Shah Kaku is mainly responsible for research and development of Basmati rice in the Punjab province and RRI, Dokri on IRRI rice in Sindh and Balochistan. IRRI 6 (Mehran – 69), a coarse rice variety, was officially released for cultivation in 1971 with the name IRRI 6 in the Punjab and Mehran – 69 in Sindh. The variety is an introduction from International Rice Research Institute. It became popular among the growers due to its high yield. It is 115 cm tall and matures in 115 days. It is grown into Zone III which is a large tract of land on the west bank of The Indus. It has an arid sub-tropical climate with 100 mm average rainfall and very high temperature, sometimes exceeding 50 degree centigrade during the rice-growing season, especially at the time of nursery growing. The climate is suitable for growing coarse verities.
Minerals present in rice like zinc, manganese, iron and copper play an important role in body regulatory functions other than cadmium and lead. A definite difference exists between varieties of brown and white rice in vitamins, minerals, and fiber and fat contents.
Quality Testing, Milling and processing of IRRI 6 at THE VISION FOODS
The paddy is cleaned to remove dust trash, stone and foreign matter and is de-hulled and milled by passing through “Stake sheller and McGill Laboratory Mill”(polisher) to obtain different fractions of rice i.e. Bran, Brown rice, white rice, polished rice and polishing. Rice is also ground by passing through “UDY Cyclone Mill” to get rice flour. The fractions and flour are analyzed for different physico-chemical and cooking quality characteristics.
Laboratory Tests of Pakistani Rice to detemine Mineral and Chemical composition
The determination of moisture content (105ºC/12hr), Ash content (550ºC/5hr), Crude fat in Soxhlet apparatus (solvent ether), Crude protein by nitrogen determination using the Kjeldhal’s method (N x 5.95) and Nitrogen free extract (NFE) by using formula and crude fiber is carried out according to their respective method given in AACC (2000).
Cooking quality is evaluated by volume expansion ratio and water absorption ratio. The volume expansion ratio is then calculated by dividing the volume of cooked rice by the volume of raw rice in the former whereas; by dividing the weight of cooked rice by the weight of raw rice .
The mineral content i.e. Fe, Cu, Zn, Mn, Pb and Cd are determined by using atomic absorption spectrophotometer (Perken Elmer) according to method given in AOAC (1990). Firstly, the samples are wet digested as reported by Richards (1969). The digested samples are transferred to 100ml volumetric flask and volume is made with distilled water and then filtered. Samples are then analyzed in Atomic Absorption spectrophotometer and estimation of each element is carried out.
Chemical Analysis of different Rice varieties of Pakistan
The results pertaining to chemical analysis are presented in Table 1 and 2 on the basis of varietal differences and milling fractions respectively, whereas, mineral estimate values are presented in Table 3. The mean values for the moisture content in different rice varieties (Table 1) ranged from 9.19 to 11.10%. The highest value for this parameter was observed in Sarshar and the lowest in Dr-83. In different milling fractions the moisture content ranged from 8.61to11.08% (Table 2) indicating the lowest in bran protein whereas while the highest moisture content was found in brown rice respectively. This moisture content is confirmed with the earlier results reported by Souci et al (1986) and Eggum (1979).
Crude protein content in different rice varieties ranged from 7.80 to 8.80% showing highest value of protein content was found in Sarshar and lowest in Irri-9 varities. While in different milling fractions the protein content ranged from 6.11 to 11.71%. The highest protein content was found in bran and the lowest in polished rice. The results obtained in the study are in line with earlier studies reported by Pederson and Eggum (1983), Eggum et al (1982).
The ash content in different rice varieties ranged from 3.16 to 3.79% obtained in Sarshar (highest) and in Dr-83 (lowest). In different milling fractions the ash content ranged from 0.54 to 6.04%. The highest ash content was found in bran whereas the lowest was found in polished rice. The findings of the present study are in accordance to the studies reported by Juliano (1985) and Willis et al. (1982). The ash content may be different in different milling fractions due to degree of severity during milling for the separation of bran.
Fat content in different rice varieties ranged from 5.16 to 6.14% the highest value of fat content was present in Irri-6 and lowest in Irri-9. While in different milling fractions the fat content ranged from 0.73 to 14.65% the highest in bran and the lowest in polished rice. The results of present study are in agreement with earlier results reported by Willis et al. (1982) and Juliano (1985) who also gave the fat range 0.9 to 1.97% in different milling fractions.
Crude fiber content ranged from 2.17 to 2.57% in different rice varieties showing highest value of fiber content in Irri-6 and the lowest one in Irri-9. Milling fractions showed the fiber content range from 0.21 to 8.38%. The highest fiber content was observed in bran and the lowest in polished rice and white rice. These results are comparable with the findings of Maningat (1981), Willis et al. (1982) with same results and Juliano (1985) who found the fiber content ranged from 0.2 to 11.4% in different milling fractions.
NFE values in different rice varieties ranged from 67.75 to 71.43%. The highest value of NFE was found in Irri-9 and lowest in Irri-6. Different milling fractions exhibited NFE value ranged from 61.21 to 81.19%. Maximum NFE value was found in polished rice and the lowest in polishing. These findings are confirmed with the earlier results reported by James and Mc Caskill (1983).
Mineral Content
The results pertaining to mineral contents during the study are presented in Figure 1 and 2 on the basis of varietal differences and milling fractions respectively. The highest iron content was found in Irri-6 (1.94%) and lowest was found in Irri-9 (1.37%). While in different milling fractions the highest iron content was found in bran (3.98%) and lowest was found in polished rice (0.44%). These results of iron in present study are in agreement with earlier findings as reported by various workers for Ash, Protein, Fat and Fiber showing similar pattern. The bran is relatively rich in minerals (Eppendorfer et al. 1983; Sotelo et al. 1990).
The highest zinc content was found in Irri-6 (2.97%) and lowest was found in Irri-9 (1.44%). While in different milling fractions the highest zinc content was found in bran (4.69%) and lowest was found in polished rice (1.12%). The results for zinc content are in line with earlier findings reported by Juliano (1980), Eppendorfer et al. (1983) and Sotelo et al. (1990) who reported higher zinc contents in bran and lowest in white rice.
Table 1. Chemical analysis of different Pakistani rice varieties
| Varieties | Moisture | Protein | Ash content | Fat Content | Fiber content | NFE |
| IRRI 6 | 11.04a | 8.77a | 3.67b | 6.14a | 2.57a | 67.75d |
| IRRI 9 | 10.01b | 7.80c | 3.43c | 5.16d | 2.17d | 71.43a |
| Sarshar | 11.10a | 8.80a | 3.79a | 5.80b | 2.47b | 68.14c |
| DR – 83 | 9.19c | 8.12b | 3.16d | 5.45c | 2.31c | 71.21b |
| Mean | 10.33 | 8.37 | 3.51 | 5.64 | 2.38 | 69.63 |
Table2. Chemical analysis of fractions obtained different Pakistani rice varieties
| Milling Fractions | Moisture | Protein | Ash content | Fat Content | Fiber content | NFE |
| Brown rice | 11.08a | 7.23c | 1.42c | 2.13c | 0.79c | 72.21c |
| White Rice | 10.93a | 6.64d | 0.66d | 0.97d | 0.21d | 80.96b |
| Polished rice | 10.99a | 6.11e | 0.54d | 0.73c | 0.21d | 81.19a |
| Bran | 8.61c | 11.71a | 6.04a | 14.65a | 8.38a | 47.58e |
| Polishing | 9.93b | 10.73b | 5.91b | 9.72b | 2.30b | 61.21d |
| Mean | 10.115 | 8.7525 | 3.2875 | 6.5175 | 2.775 | 67.735 |
The highest manganese content was found in Dr-83 (2.33%) and lowest was found in Irri-9 (1.57%). While in different milling fractions the highest manganese content was found in bran (5.12%) and lowest was found in polished rice (0.51%). The findings of present study are similar to earlier findings of Houston and Kohler (1970) and Eppendorfer et al. (1983).
The highest copper content was found in Irri-9 (0.92%) and lowest was found in Dr-83 (0.58%). While in different milling fractions the highest copper content was found in bran (1.69%) and lowest was found in polished rice (0.28%). The range of copper in different fractions of rice varieties is confirmed by the results of the Juliano (1990), and Eppendorf et al. (1983) and Sotelo et al. (1990).
The lead was not found in all fractions of rice cultivars by the procedure adopted. Since the presence of lead and cadmium are injurious to health, therefore present results suggested that rice cultivars can be safely consumed.
Cooking Quality
The means values of volume expansion ratio and water absorption ratio are given in Table 3-4.
Volume expansion ratio
The significantly highest volume expansion ratio was exhibited by Sarshar (3.15) while the lowest was observed in Irri-9 (2.68) (Table 3). The lowest volume expansion ratio was observed in brown rice (1.95) (Table 4). Volume expansion ratio in different milling fractions in present study is similar with earlier findings of Awan (1988). High variability in fractions was observed within and between varieties for volume expansion ratio. In Pakistan rice varieties with more volume expansion ratios are preferred generally.
Water absorption Ratio
The highest water absorption ratio was in Sarshar (2.31) while lowest was in Irri-9 (2.25). The lowest water absorption ratio was observed in brown rice (1.71) followed by white rice (2.51) and polished rice (2.65). The results in present study are in agreement with earlier studies reported by Awan (1988).
The results regarding volume expansion ratio and water absorption ratio showed significant variations among the rice cultivars. This indicates that the rice cultivars i.e. Sarshar and Irri-6 with higher ratio of volume expansion and water absorption capacity regarded as better in cooking quality than others.
Table3. Means of cooking quality parameters of different Pakistani rice varieties
| Varieties | Mean of Volume expansion Ratio | Means Volume absorption ratio |
| IRRI 6 | 2.74 | 2.30 |
| IRRI 9 | 2.68 | 2.25 |
| Sarshar | 3.15 | 2.31 |
| Dr – 83 | 2.99 | 2.30 |
| Mean | 2.89 | 2.29 |
Table4. Means of cooking quality parameters of different Pakistani rice varieties
| Varieties | Mean of Volume expansion Ratio | Means Volume absorption ratio |
| Brown rice | 1.95 | 1.71 |
| White rice | 3.22 | 2.51 |
| Polished rice | 3.50 | 2.65 |
| Mean | 2.89 | 2.29 |
INDIAN PROXY WAR – Attack on General Headquarters, Rawalpindi
India, backed by Israel has got a chance to lay hands on Pakistan under the cover of its operation in Afghanistan for Global War on Terror. It is now well know that Israel and India has planned, financed, trained and equipped insurgency, violence and unrest in North Western Pakistan. Today (October 10, 2009) an Attack accord on Army’s Headquarters in Rawalpindi. The details are:
http://www.thevisionfoods.com
Heavy firing heard near GHQ
RAWALPINDI: Heavy firing heard near GHQ, sources said.
Heavy firing, blasts near GHQ in Pindi
RAWALPINDI: Heavy firing has been reported near GHQ army Headquarters here in Rawalpindi, meanwhile, several loud explosions have also been heard, Geo news reported. Soldiers guarding army headquarters opened fire at a suspected suicide bomber in a vehicle on Saturday, a security official and media said.
According to an eyewitness, the shooting began when a white Suzuki vehicle was intercepted by army personnel for routine checking at army checkpost near army headquarters on Mall Road, so the miscreants, sitting on vehicle, opened heavy and indiscriminate firing meanwhile, army soldiers have surrounded the vehicle and started retaliation. As many as five hand grenades have been hurled from the vehicle meanwhile, the entire area has been cordoned off and the roads leading to GHQ have been closed for traffic, sources said. The details said firing is still going on with gunmen who had tried to enter the tightly guarded sprawling headquarters in the city of Rawalpindi, near the capital, Islamabad.
Army commandos have kicked off search operation to locate some fled miscreants into areas adjacent to GHQ, witnesses said. Moreover, the miscreants are dressed in army uniform while army helicopters have began hovering over the firing spot. Witnesses also feared there might be heavy explosive materials inside the vehicle.
Four killed, two held outside GHQ
RAWALPINDI: At least four militants were killed and two were arrested amid firing between miscreants and army commandos outside army headquarters while the situation has been brought under control, army sources said. Some security personnel might be martyred during offensive, sources feared.
Search operation air surveillance at GHQ
RAWALPINDI: Firing has come to halt after one-hour long army operation outside army GHQ, Geo news reported on Friday morning, meanwhile, search operation and air surveillance is still continued. At least four terrorists were killed and two were arrested while a dead body of an unidentified person was also recovered form the encounter place, sources said. The miscreants have been overpowered and the situation is under completely control, spokesman ISPR Ather Abbas confirmed to Geo news.
According to details suspected militants attacked tightly guarded army headquarters on Saturday, as they were in a white Suzuki vehicle and were intercepted at army checkpost no 1, they opened fire and threw five grenades at a main gate, security officials and media said. ”They wore army uniforms and tried to enter the headquarters area but when they were stopped they opened fire and hurled hand grenades,” a security official told media.
Four terrorists were killed and two were arrested during one-hour long encounter, army sources said. The suspected militants had driven up to the gate in a white Suzuki van that was carrying explosives, the official said. Media sources said firing was still going on with the two or three gunmen for forty minutes after the attack was launched. Three blasts had been heard, they said. Soldiers sealed off roads leading to the headquarters and ahelicopter was hovering over the area.
All terrorists killed in GHQ gun battle: ISPR
ISLAMABAD: The spokesman Pakistan army Major General Athar Abbas has confirmed to Geo news that the situation outside army General Headquarters (GHQ) has been brought under total control meanwhile, all four terrorists who carried out gun onslaught at army checkpost, have been killed.
According to sources, four terrorists, driving a white Suzuki van and dressed in army uniform, opened firing and hurled hand grenades at army checkpost outside headquarters’ main gate, which security forces retaliated successfully, killing all four terrorists while two were arrested. Some security guards were also embrace martyrdom during offensive, Abbas said, adding, army commandos had cordoned off the entire area and search operation remained underway to locate other militants who might have fled through adjacent areas. The miscreants have been overpowered and the situation is under complete control just after one-hour long gunbattle, spokesman ISPR Athar Abbas confirmed to Geo news.
According to details suspected militants attacked tightly guarded army headquarters on Saturday, as they were in a white Suzuki vehicle and were intercepted at army checkpost no 1, they opened fire and threw five hand grenades at a main gate, security officials and media said. ”They wore army uniforms and tried to enter the headquarters area but when they were stopped they opened fire and hurled hand grenades and later were killed following a deadly gunbattle,” a security official told media. Four terrorists were killed and two were arrested during one-hour long encounter and four army men embraced martyrdom, army sources said. Media sources said firing continued with the two or three gunmen for forty minutes after the attack was launched. Three blasts had been heard, they said. Soldiers had sealed off roads leading to the headquarters and two helicopters remained hovering over the area.
4 army men killed in attack: ISPR
RAWALPINDI: The Director General of Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Athar Abbas has confirmed that four army personnel have been killed during the attack at GHQ on Saturday, Geo News reported.
Six army men martyred in GHQ onslaught
ISLAMABAD: Spokesman Pakistan armed forces and DG ISPR Major General Athar Abbas said Friday that six army personnel embraced martyrdom during gunbattle with suspected Taliban militant outside army headquarters in Rawalpindi, Geo news reported. This ISPR spokesman stated while giving details on the military-militants encounter during Geo news program Aaj Kamran Khan Kay Sath. He said the search operation cum air surveillance, with a view to locate the fled militants, are underway in areas adjacent to headquarters.
GHQ attack foiled
RAWALPINDI: Pakistan army has foiled the terrorists attack on GHQ and killed four terrorists whereas six army men embraced shahadat during the action completed within one hour. According to reports, four terrorists riding in a white car targeted check post near GHQ. They tried to move another check post when security guards intercept them. Security forces retaliated swiftly and effectively and killed four terrorists during an hour long action. Six security personnel had been martyred in the operation.
DG ISPR Major General Athar Abbas said terrorists wearing forces uniform and riding in a white Suzuki car attacked first check post with automatic weapons. On the resistance of security guards, they tried to move towards another check point. Four terrorists were killed during exchange of fire. The area has been cordoned off as search operation in underway in the area and situation is completely under control.
Two fleeing terrorists under siege in Rawalpindi
RAWALPINDI: Two terrorists who escaped after attacking GHQ have taken refuge in a security office near second GHQ check post, ISPR said Saturday. Security personnel have surrounded the office, ISPR added.
Earlier, six terrorists attempted to launch an attack on GHQ which was foiled by the security personnel. Four terrorists were killed while two escaped from the scene. Six security men were also martyred in the incident. The security men later found that the escaped terrorists took shelter in a nearby security office which is now surrounded by security forces.
The security forces have also raided a house in Islamabad, about 4 to 5 kilometers away from GHQ, where the terrorists had been residing before launching today’s attack, sources said. Security forces have arrested the owner of the house where the terrorists had planned the attack, sources added. The terrorists were believed to have been residing in this house for the last three to four months, sources said. Security uniforms, hand grenades and detonators have been recovered from the house, sources said.
6 security men martyred, 4 terrorists killed in failed GHQ attack
RAWALPINDI: The terrorists attack on GHQ has been foiled as four terrorists were killed and six security personnel martyred in the action whereas search operation for two terrorists still at large is underway. According to reports, terrorists in army uniform attempted to get entry into GHQ at 11:30 am on Saturday from gate no 1. When stopped by security officials, they reached at check post no 1 and opened fire on security men after taking positions after leaving the car. Four terrorists were killed and two fled during trade of fire between security officials and terrorists. Army gunship helicopters started hovering over the area for vigilance. The commandos seized the bodies of terrorists and shifted them.
DG ISPR Athar Abbas confirmed killing of four terrorists whereas six security officials were also martyred in the operation. Two terrorists managed to flee. Search operation is underway in the area to nab the two terrorists at large. All roads leading to GHQ have been sealed after the incident.
Terrorists hold 10-15 people hostage in security office
ISLAMABAD: About 4 to 5 terrorists in a security office near second GHQ check post are holding 10-15 people, including security and civil personnel, hostage after the attempted attack on GHQ, DG ISPR Maj. General Athar Abbas said on Saturday. Security personnel have surrounded the office, ISPR added.
Earlier, six terrorists attempted to launch an attack on GHQ which was foiled by the security personnel. Four terrorists were killed while two escaped from the scene. Six security men including a Brigadier Anwar and Lt. Col. Wasim were also martyred in the incident. Six terrorists in army uniform attempted to get entry into GHQ at 11:30 am on Saturday from gate no 1. When stopped by security officials, they reached at check post no 1 and opened fire on security men after taking positions after leaving the car. Four terrorists were killed and two fled during trade of fire between security officials and terrorists. Army gunship helicopters started hovering over the area for vigilance. The commandos seized the bodies of terrorists and shifted them.
The DG ISPR confirmed killing of four terrorists whereas six security personnel including Brigadier Anwar and Lt. Col. Wasim were also martyred in the operation. Two terrorists managed to flee. The security men later found that the escaped terrorists took shelter in a nearby security office which is now surrounded by security forces. The ISPR said that more than two terrorists are in the security office where several security personnel are held hostage.
Responsibility of Attack
KARACHI: Tahreek-e-Taliban (Ajmad Farooqi) group has claimed responsibility of attack on army headquarters. In a telephone call made to Geo News office, member of TTP group demanded
- Halt of operation in northern areas,
- Accountability of former President Pervez Musharraf,
- Return of black water and
- Closure of Western NGOs.
Condemns
President Zardari condemns GHQ attack
ISLAMABAD: President Asif Ali Zardari has condemned the attack at GHQ in Rawalpindi. President Zardari in his statement said such incidents could not weaken governments’ commitment against terrorism.
PM Gilani slams GHQ attack
ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani slammed the attack at military headquarters in Rawalpindi.
Coal reserves of Pakistan are endagered to be sold on throw away Prices
|
Thar coal Reserves
 http://www.thevisionfoods.com
These reserves estimated at 850 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of gas, about 30 times higher than Pakistan ’s proven gas reserves of 28 TCF. Dr Murtaza Mughal president of Pakistan Economy Watch in a statement said that these reserves of coal worth USD 25 trillion can not only cater the electricity requirements of the country for next 100 years but also save almost four billion dollars in staggering oil import bill. Just 2% usage of Thar Coal Can Produce 20,000 Mega Watts of Electricity for next 40Years ,without any single Second of Load Shedding. The coal power generation would cost Pakistan PKR 5.67 per unit while power generated by Independent Power Projects cost PKR 9.27. It Requires Just Initial 420 Billion Rupees Initial Investment, Whereas Pakistan Receives annually 1220 Billion from Tax Only. Chinese and other companies had not only carried out surveys and feasibilities of this project but also offered 100 percent investment in last 7 to 8 years but the “Petroleum Gang” always discouraged them in a very systematic way. But Petroleum lobby, is very strong in Pakistan and they are against any other means of power generation except for the imported oil. This lobby is major beneficiary of the increasing oil bill that is estimated above 15 billion dollar this year. Even GOVT is planning to Sell all these reserve to a company on a very low price. Think About This, How We Can Help Our Home Land .
|
Full Text of The Kerry-Lugar Bill – Details and Conditions
The following is the text of the Kerry-Lugar Bill passed by the Senate on Thursday, Sept 24, 2009.
http://www.thevisionfoods.com
S.1707
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)
SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.
(a) Limitation on Security-related Assistance: For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.
(b) Limitation on Arms Transfers: For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.
(c) Certification: The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;
(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and (3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.
(d) Certain Payments: (1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to (A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; (B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.
(2) EXCEPTION: Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).
(e) Waiver: (1) IN GENERAL – The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.
(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER: The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefore. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.
(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.
(a) For Fiscal Year 2010: (1) IN GENERAL – For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the `Fund’, shall consist of the following: (A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).
(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.
(2) PURPOSES OF FUND: Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorised to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defence, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.
(3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY: (A) IN GENERAL – The Secretary of State is authorised to transfer amounts in the fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defence, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.
(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS: Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.
(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES: The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.
(D) NOTIFICATION: The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.
(b) Submission of Notifications: Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN ASSISTANCE
(a) Requirements: (1) IN GENERAL – For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.
(2) DOCUMENTATION: For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defence, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.
(b) Waiver: 1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE: The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defence, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.
(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS: The Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defence) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.
(c) Application to Certain Activities- Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to (1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.); (2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes; (3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office; (4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended; (5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and (6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4578).
(d) Definitions- In this section (1) the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the term ‘civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.
TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS.
(a) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report- Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following: (1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.
(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.
(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.
(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.
(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.
(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual `Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’: (A) Civil liberties. (B) Political rights. (C) Voice and accountability. (D) Government effectiveness. (E) Rule of law. (F) Control of corruption. (G) Immunization rates. (H) Public expenditure on health. (I) Girls’ primary education completion rate. (J) Public expenditure on primary education. (K) Natural resource management. (L) Business start-up. (M) Land rights and access. (N) Trade policy. (O) Regulatory quality. (P) Inflation control. (Q) Fiscal policy.
(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.
(b) Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report: (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS: It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.
(3) REPORT: (A) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).
(B) CONTENTS- The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.
(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED: In this paragraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(c) Security-related Assistance Plan- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.
SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS.
(a) Semi-Annual Monitoring Report- Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include—
(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available; (2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification; (3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act; (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program; (5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds; (6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any; (7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act; (8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103; (9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000; (10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6); (11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism; (12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise; (13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program; (14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and (15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.
(b) Government Accountability Office Reports:
(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT: Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains (A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; (B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act; (C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC.
Ecstasy, an Israeli New Millennium Gift to the world
Research By:
Syed Haroon Haider Gilani
Preface
Recently I saw ads on internet offering one of the best selling drugs around the globe today, called Ecstasy, in Pakistan which is so far safe from this Jewish products and chemical weapons to destroy entire generation. I have observed the use of this destroyer in UAE, Singapore and in Italy where this is the fashion symbol now in parties and pleasure consequently entitled as “the Party drug” or ” The Love Drug”.
http://www.thevisionfoods.com
I am off the opinion that Pakistan is not a lucrative market for Ecstasy at all due to its high price and lower intoxication and tranquility as compared to Heroin, opium and Hashish etc.
Besides my opinion that Pakistan is not an attractive market for Ecstasy, the main threat to its popularity is because of variety of reasons including that the masterminds behind Ecstasy Trade are Israeli Jews who are ” innovative, industrious and entrepreneurers who always find ways to create and develop markets for their products. Secondly we always import our social trends and fashion from West where Ecstasy is now in the top line.
For the case of Ecstasy, profits are enormous. It costs 15 to 25 cents to produce one Ecstasy tablet, which by the time a drug dealer sells it at a disco or on a college campus, it can fetch between $25 and $40. In Pakistan wide consumption can lead to enormous profits too due to the restively high drug addiction rate with numbers exceeding 7 million drug addicts in 2005, touching 10 million in 2009. According to the Director Anti-Narcotic Force Anwar Hafeez, Pakistan has the highest number of drug addicts in the world. Initiator Human Development Foundation in 2008 claimed that only in Karachi there are over 2 million youth and children drug addicts while drug trafficking is prevailing in every part of the city.
In Karachi and other major cities of Pakistan the main addiction is of Hashish, because this drug is easily available at every nook and corner of the city. Drug supply is available all around the city through those street children. Drug usage in education institutes, parties and ceremonies is now common and becoming a fashion rapidly in upper class and mode of mental relaxation for suppressed middle and lower classes. Smoking hashish (charas) has become popular among youngsters, especially girls, as it is easily available and has become a symbol of modernity. Earlier, primarily boys were smoking hashish but now girls are also using it frequently.
A psychiatrist from Adil Hospital in Defense said that smoking drugs in cigarettes had been very common in the West but now this had penetrated our society as well. He said that teenagers claiming that they were able to concentrate better after smoking hashish were mistaken. He said that habitual smokers of hashish became moody and developed a volition syndrome, which made them less certain about their life. He added that a continuous use caused a personality change.
In such scenario, all social, economical, educational and political circles, organizations and individuals with the realization of already drug polluted country must stand up to fight the threat which is now turning its face towards, Pakistan and education and awareness to be widely, properly and timely be spread across the nation before the trouble begins here.
Weapon of mass destruction, Ecstasy
Ecstasy (“E“, “X“, “XTC“) is a term used to refer to a type of illicit street tablet or party drug containing one or more different psychoactive drugs sold on the black market and intended for recreational uses. Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA; commonly called Ecstasy itself) is the primary active agent, though such tablets may contain other compounds as well; MDMA may be entirely absent from an “Ecstasy” tablet.
Apart from their differing chemical composition, tablets are differentiated by size, shape, color, and imprinted design. Tablets will typically be identified by street names such as “Blue Mitsubishi”, and “Purple Buddha”.
Harms of Ecstasy
A paper published in medical journal The Lancet ranked “Ecstasy” as the 18th most dangerous drug in the U.K. (based on potential for physical harm and risk of addiction). To put this into context, heroin was the most harmful, cocaine second, alcohol fifth and cannabis eleventh.
MDMA, known widely as Ecstasy, is used by young people to produce hallucinogenic and amphetamine-like effects. New research has found that even a small amount of Ecstasy can be harmful to the brain even with first-time users.
Radiologists at the Academic Medical Center at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands conducted the first study of low dosages of the drug on first-time users. “We found a decrease in blood circulation in some areas of the brain in young adults who just started to use ecstasy,” said Maartje de Win, M.D., in a news release. “In addition, we found a relative decrease in verbal memory performance in ecstasy users compared to non-users.” In the U.S., it is estimated that 5.4 percent of all high school seniors have taken ecstasy at least once. People who use ecstasy for the first time could suffer impaired memory and harm to their brains, a new study of the dance drug’s effects reveals. Even low doses can cause changes to the brain,
According to James Randerson, science correspondent, The Guardian, in his article about this study, on Tuesday 28 November 2006 says, “The drug’s effects are thought to come from disruption of the regulation of serotonin, a brain chemical believed to play a role in mood and memory.”
Dr de Win’s team selected 77 men and 111 women who had never used the drug before. The group’s average age at the start of the study was 21. The researchers performed brain scans to measure blood flow in different parts of the brain and subjected the volunteers to various psychological tests.
Eighteen months later, the team looked at 59 of the original study group who admitted to subsequently trying the drug and 56 who had stayed off it. The users had taken a total of six pills on average. By repeating the tests, the team found subtle changes to cell architecture and decreased blood flow in some brain regions. They also found the ecstasy users performed worse than the non-users on memory tests. There was no indication that the drug affected the users’ mood or had an effect on serotonin-producing neurons.
Previous research has shown that long-term or heavy ecstasy use can damage serotonin-dependent neurons and cause depression, anxiety, confusion, difficulty sleeping and decrease in memory. But this is the first study to look at the effects of low doses of the drug on first-time users.
Physical Harms
In a recent report (a review of its harms and classification under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971) to the Home Secretary of United Kingdom, by Professor David Nutt FmedSci, The Chairman of The Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), the harms of Ecstasy are detailed as:
- There have been more than 200 reported ecstasy-related deaths in the UK over the last 15 years, with 43 in 2001 in England and Wales alone.
- MDMA has undoubted harms, causing direct toxicity especially when taken in high doses. However, many of the other physical harms of MDMA are associated with behaviours in which the users subsequently engage, such as energetic dancing for long periods.
- Published literature provides a heterogeneous picture, with case reports detailing acute complications including death occurring after limited exposure (including consumption of a single tablet) (Rogers et al., 2009). Presentations to accident and emergency departments after taking MDMA are usually associated with poly-substance use (80% with alcohol, 24% cocaine and 21% ketamine) (Dargan, 2008).
- Admission data from Newcastle (Dargan, 2008) show that the number of admissions due to MDMA between 2000 and 2007 varies between 22 and 35 per year. This is compared with around 15 per year for amphetamines and, following a recent increase, over 30 per year for cocaine. Data from presentations to St Thomas’ Hospital, London (2005 to 2008) show that, for those agents classed as recreational drugs, MDMA was the third most common drug behind cocaine and GHB, being involved in a total of 382 presentations (Dargan, 2008). However, of these MDMA presentations, only 52 were as sole drug; 85% involved co‑ingestants, of which alcohol, GHB and ketamine were the most common.
- The total number of admissions to hospital due to MDMA (alone or in combination) is not known. But, if the data provided by St Thomas’ and Newcastle hospitals are considered indicative, it is likely to be of the order of several thousand per year. By way of comparison, there were over 57,000 recorded hospital admissions in 2006/07 with a primary diagnosis of alcohol poisoning and 846 with a primary diagnosis of cannabis poisoning (Department of Health/National Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse, 2008). Estimates for all hospital admissions to which alcohol contributes are over 800,000 per year with over 200,000 admissions with alcohol-specific conditions.
- Data obtained from the National Poisons Information Service (NPIS) show that among Class A drugs MDMA, historically, has been the most common drug of misuse where information has been accessed (National Poisons Information Service, 2008). However, the proportion of telephone enquiries related to MDMA acute toxicity fell sharply between 2004/05 and 2006/07. In contrast, the proportion of those enquiries relating to cocaine has increased over the same period and is currently a more common drug for enquiry than MDMA (National Poisons Information Service, 2008). The NPIS data, however, are limited in providing any indication of the true incidence of toxicity cases.
- MDMA overdose has a profile of toxicity similar to, but with somewhat less severe outcomes than that seen with amphetamines and cocaine (Dargan, 2008). Cardiovascular effects (elevated blood pressure and heart rate) are prominent and consistent with the amphetamine-like nature of MDMA; epileptic seizures are sometimes seen. Cocaine has a similar toxicity profile, but has a higher rate of cardiac problems associated, especially myocardial infarction, particularly when taken with alcohol (Devlin and Henry, 2008). On rare occasions, use of amphetamines, cocaine and MDMA can lead to intracerebral and subarachnoid haemorrhage (Gledhill et al., 1993; McEvoy et al., 2000) and it would appear that, in the majority of reported cases, the haemorrhage appeared to be related to an underlying vascular malformation.
- MDMA is often taken in night/dance clubs and settings where the temperature may already be high and the individual is engaged in prolonged dancing. These factors, coupled with MDMA use, can be dangerous, especially if associated with dehydration – sometimes leading to exertional hyperpyrexia/hyperthermia (raised body temperature). This was the explanation for some of the first MDMA fatalities which occurred in dance clubs when users had danced for prolonged periods in high temperatures while drinking very little water. In 1996, the ACMD acted on these incidents and issued advice to Ministers and suggested guidance to users to ensure adequate hydration when dancing for long periods (Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs, 1996). This was coupled with guidance to local authorities and club owners to provide free water and ‘chill-out’ rooms, to reduce such incidents. New safe clubbing guidelines – Safer Nightlife – have recently been issued by the London Drug Policy Forum (2008).
- Water intoxication (with secondary low blood sodium levels – hyponatraemia) is a condition also associated with the use of MDMA. This can be as a result of excessive water intake, in an attempt to prevent dehydration after taking MDMA. In some people, MDMA may cause excessive secretion of antidiuretic hormone, which makes the kidneys retain water, so aggravating the consequences of excessive water intake (Devlin and Henry, 2008).
- Data presented to the ACMD identified nine published case reports of fatalities due to hyponatraemia between 1997 and 2002 and one in 2006 (Rogers et al., 2009). Twenty-four case series or case reports involving non-fatal hyponatraemia were also identified. All fatal cases were in women aged between 16 and 21. The propensity for women to be disproportionately affected is probably due to the lower ratio of body water to body mass in women.
- Cases of acute liver injury (hepatitis) are occasionally reported. These can be secondary to hyperthermia or caused by direct hepatotoxicity from the drug; in the latter case, it may re-occur if MDMA is taken again (Devlin and Henry, 2008).
- The National Programme on Substance Abuse Deaths (np-SAD) maintains the Special Mortality Register (SMR). The dataset is unlikely to be fully complete as it records the voluntary submissions of coroners’ reports for England and Wales and there are differences in the way coroners, or their pathologists, incorporate findings. The General Mortality Register (GMR) is a database maintained by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) based on information from death certificates and coroners’ reports. Accuracy of the dataset relies on the information recorded by the coroner. Full toxicological data on all of the drugs detected at post-mortem are not always cited on the death certificate, and in some situations it can be difficult to ascribe the drug(s) responsible for the death (Hickman et al., 2007).
- Between 1999 and 2001, the data from the GMR show a rise in drugrelated deaths, where ‘ecstasy’ was the sole drug mentioned. Thereafter, the number of deaths attributed to ‘ecstasy’ reached a plateau while both cocaine- and, to a lesser extent, amphetamine-related deaths continued to rise (Figure 1).
- Data from the np-SAD for the period 1997 to 2006 recorded that MDMA was implicated in a mean of 50 deaths per year and around 10 where it was considered the sole drug (Rogers et al., 2009). Data from ONS using the GMR in the period 1993 to 2006 record a mean 33 deaths per year where MDMA is implicated and 17 where it was considered the sole drug (Table 3) (Rogers et al., 2009). The difference between the GMR and np-SAD figures will be due to the differences in data reporting and data sources used.
- Table 3 shows the number of drug-related deaths for selected causes either as the sole drug or as one of the drugs involved. There are fewer deaths implicating MDMA than several other Class A drugs (such as heroin, methadone and cocaine) and a similar number of deaths due to amphetamines.
- Data from the General Register Office for Scotland (GRO) show that, between 1995 and 2007, there was an average of 2.5 deaths a year which involved only ‘ecstasy’, or only ‘ecstasy-type’ drugs, or only these and alcohol (General Register for Scotland, 2007).
- Np-SAD data suggest that, for those deaths where MDMA has been implicated, the individuals tend to be younger with a greater likelihood of being employed. This is in contrast to those deaths where amphetamine is implicated. Fatalities where ‘ecstasy’ is implicated also tend to be more associated with concurrent alcohol and cocaine use and less with heroin and methadone use than those from amphetamines.
- It is particularly difficult to estimate the risk of taking any given MDMA dose due to the lack of information on the average level of consumption and dose-response relationship between tablet intake and increased risk of overdose, as well as uncertainty surrounding the number of ‘ecstasy’ users. For example, in 1995/96 a 25-fold range was estimated for ‘ecstasy’-related death among 15 to 24-year-olds of between one in 2,000 and one in 50,000 users (Gore, 1999). Equally, if we assume that there are 1.2 million adult ‘ecstasy’ users and that approximately 60 million tablets are consumed annually (Home Office, 2006a) then the risk of death per person and per tablet is: one in 39,000 and one in 1.8 million respectively, if all deaths mentioning ‘ecstasy’ are included; and one in 76,000 and one in 3.5 million respectively, if only those deaths solely mentioning ‘ecstasy’ are included.
- In attempting to quantify the intrinsic fatal toxicity risk of MDMA, as measured by the ratio of deaths to availability, we looked at mortality data from the ONS for the period 2003 to 2007. Three separate measures of an index of fatal toxicity (T1, T2 and T38) were calculated as the total number of cases in which the drug was mentioned on death certificates9 divided by, respectively: (i) the number of users of that drug (T1). The number of users (16 to 59-year-olds) was derived from the BCS (Home Office, 2004; 2005b; 2006b; 2007) based on the estimated number of users in the last year over the same period; (ii) seizures by law enforcement agencies (T2). Drug seizure data were taken from Home Office (2008); and (iii) estimates of the market size of each drug in England and Wales (T3). Market size was derived from Home Office data (Home Office, 2006b). The data were then normalised such that, for each scale, heroin = 1,000. Values of T1, T2 and T3 are listed in Table 4. For each scale, amphetamine, MDMA and cocaine have a broadly similar fatal toxicity, which is considerably lower than that of heroin.
- A study of all drug-related deaths in Scotland during the 1990s found that every death where MDMA was involved was reported in the newspapers (Forsyth, 2001). Deaths due to other drugs were much less likely to be reported; for example, only one in 50 were reported for diazepam and for amphetamine it was one in three. The skewed reporting of ‘ecstasy’ against the landscape of other drug-related harms and deaths is a real phenomenon and may heavily impact on public perception.
Societal harms
- While MDMA clearly can have a major impact on some users and their families, there are few data suggesting negative impacts on society when directly compared with the other widely used Class A drugs, namely heroin and cocaine. Policing priorities in relation to possession (as discussed in Section 3) appear to reflect this.
- MDMA users are more likely to be in employment than heroin, cocaine and amphetamine users (Rogers et al., 2009) and usually fund their drug purchases from their own income rather than from acquisitive crime (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2008).
- In contrast to alcohol and stimulants, there are few public order offences deriving solely from the use of MDMA (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2008).
- ‘Ecstasy’ use has been implicated in only a very small proportion of serious sexual assault cases (0.65%) (ACPO, pers comm., 2008). Compared to ‘ecstasy’, there are over four times as many recorded victims of serious sexual assault under the influence of heroin and nearly three times as many under the influence of cocaine. In cases where the perpetrators are recorded as being, or are believed to be, under the influence of ‘ecstasy’, the figures for ‘ecstasy’ and heroin are similar.
- There is evidence of the involvement of organised crime in the trafficking of MDMA both into and within the UK. There is less certainty with regard to the relative extent to which organised criminal groups specialise in such commodity dealing or whether the trafficking of MDMA is part of the multi-commodity nature of organised crime where profit and risk are assessed against both the commodity and the market. At a local level, supply of MDMA is prominently, though not exclusively, based within the night club environment.
- It is not known what impact, if any, the classification of MDMA as Class A has on criminal activity. Downgrading would reduce the maximium sentence for production or supply from life to 14 years. However, data suggest that downgrading would not require concomitant provision of greater leniency by the judiciary, as in 2006 there was not one case of possession with intent to supply where the sentence given exceeded 10 years. Whether separating MDMA from other Class A drugs could have health and societal benefits through separating drug markets and reducing ‘one-stop-shop’ drug dealers that encourage heroin and crack cocaine/cocaine use has been suggested, but is not certain.
History of Ecstasy
MDMA was first synthesized in 1912 by Merck chemist Anton Köllisch. At the time, Merck was interested in developing substances that stopped abnormal bleeding. Merck wanted to evade an existing patent, held by Bayer, for one such compound - hydrastinine. At the behest of his superiors Walther Beckh and Otto Wolfes, Köllisch developed a preparation of a hydrastinine analogue, methyl hydrastinine. MDMA was an intermediate compound in the synthesis of methyl hydrastinine, and Merck was not interested in its properties at the time. On December 24, 1912 Merck filed two patent applications that described the synthesis of MDMA[8] and its subsequent conversion to methyl hydrastinine.
Over the following 65 years, MDMA was largely forgotten. Merck records indicate that its researchers returned to the compound sporadically. In 1927, Max Oberlin studied the pharmacology of MDMA and observed that its effects on blood sugar and smooth muscles were similar to ephedrine’s, but that, in contrast, MDMA did not appear to produce pupil dilation. Researchers at Merck conducted experiments with MDMA in 1952 and 1959. In 1953 and 1954, the United States Army commissioned a study of toxicity and behavioral effects in animals of injected mescaline and several analogues, including MDMA. These originally classified investigations were declassified and published in 1973. The first scientific paper on MDMA appeared in 1958 in Yakugaku Zasshi, the Journal of the Pharmaceutical Society of Japan. In this paper, Yutaka Kasuya described the synthesis of MDMA, a part of his research on antispasmodics.
Emergence of “Ecstasy”, the Love Drug
MDMA first appeared as a street drug in the early 1970s after its counterculture analogue, MDA, became criminalized in the United States in 1970. In the mid-1970s, Alexander Shulgin, then at University of California, heard from his students about unusual effects of MDMA; among others, the drug had helped one of them to overcome his stutter. Intrigued, Shulgin synthesized MDMA and tried it himself in 1976. Two years later, he and David Nichols published the first report on the drug’s psychotropic effect in humans. They described “altered state of consciousness with emotional and sensual overtones” that can be compared “to marijuana, to psilocybin devoid of the hallucinatory component”.
Shulgin took to occasionally using MDMA for relaxation, referring to it as “my low-calorie martini”, and giving the drug to his friends, researchers, and other people whom he thought could benefit from it. One such person was psychotherapist Leo Zeff, who had been known to use psychedelics in his practice. Zeff was so impressed with the action of MDMA that he came out of his semi-retirement to proselytize for it. Over the following years, Zeff traveled around the U.S. and occasionally to Europe training other psychotherapists in the use of MDMA. Among underground psychotherapists, MDMA developed a reputation for enhancing communication during clinical sessions, reducing patients’ psychological defenses, and increasing capacity for therapeutic introspection.
Due to the wording of the United Kingdom’s existing Misuse of Drugs Act of 1971, MDMA was automatically classified in the U.K. as a Class A drug in 1977.
In the early 1980s in the U.S., MDMA rose to prominence as “Adam” in trendy nightclubs and gay dance clubs in the Dallas area. From there, use spread to raves in major cities around the country, and then to mainstream society. The drug was first proposed for scheduling by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in July 1984 and was classified as a Schedule I controlled substance in the U.S. on May 31, 1985.
In the late 1980s MDMA, as “ecstasy”, began to be widely used in the U.K. and other parts of Europe, becoming an integral element of rave culture and other psychedelic- and dance-floor-influenced music scenes, such as Madchester and Acid House. Spreading along with rave culture, illicit MDMA use became increasingly widespread among young adults in universities and later in high schools. MDMA became one of the four most widely used illicit drugs in the U.S., along with cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. According to some estimates as of 2004, only marijuana attracts more first time users in the U.S.
After MDMA was criminalized, most medical use stopped, although some therapists continued to prescribe the drug illegally. Later Charles Grob initiated an ascending-dose safety study in healthy volunteers. Subsequent legally-approved MDMA studies in humans have taken place in the U.S. in Detroit (Wayne State University), Chicago (University of Chicago), San Francisco (UCSF and California Pacific Medical Center), Baltimore (NIDA-NIH Intramural Program), and South Carolina, as well as in Switzerland (University Hospital of Psychiatry, Zürich), the Netherlands (Maastricht University), and Spain (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona).
In the mid-to-late 1990s—when the emergence of a massive market for ecstasy reconfigured the power structure of the world drug market, Israel is at the center of international trade in the drug ecstasy, according to the U.S. State Department. Ecstasy, along with marijuana, hashish, heroin, and cocaine, is heavily used and traded in Israel today, in what some call a sign of the times. Contemporary Israel is an affluent, drug-consuming country-with an estimated 300,000 casual drug users and some 20,000 junkies. In 2000 alone, police confiscated 270,000 Ecstasy tablets from smugglers, students, and partygoers in a series of stings. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates, more than 15 million junkies reside. But they add up to serious drug problems, especially among Israeli youth-and have led to commando-style raids in tree-lined residential neighborhoods of Jerusalem, Haifa, and Tel Aviv. According to a report of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, 75 percent of all crime in Israel is drug-related.
Since its first appearance in the 1990s in Tel Aviv’s bohemian Schenken Street and “Florentine” neighborhoods, Ecstasy spread rapidly to discos and popular hotspots. “Israeli kids embraced the warm, feel-good sensation they got from the drug,” said a Tel Aviv cop, “and it didn’t have to be injected or snorted.” Possession of Ecstasy is a felony in Israel with penalties of up to 20 years in prison. But as the Jerusalem Post has reported, Israeli law-enforcement officials tend to target the dealers, leaving the weekend rave parties alone. The young men and women consuming Ecstasy in clubs in Tel Aviv and other parts of the country represent a new breed of Israeli, raised on the pursuit of pleasures glimpsed in shopping malls or on cable TV, rather than on an ethos of self-sacrifice and the greater “Zionist good”.
Ecstasy Trade
Israeli dealers are not content only with local distribution, however. Working with Dutch and Belgian criminal connections, they were instrumental in marketing the drug and creating the demand in Europe and throughout the world, according to DEA agents working in Europe. They used Western Europe as a hub to distribute Ecstasy globally, since the pill-making technology and the chemicals required to make the drug could easily be found in the Netherlands and Belgium. With their existing smuggling networks, the Israelis easily “flooded the market in Europe, in Israel, and in the United States,” according to a federal U.S. law enforcement official in the Netherlands, “and once the customers asked for more, you could almost print the money yourself.”
The Ecstasy profits are enormous. It costs 15 to 25 cents to produce one Ecstasy tablet, which wholesalers will sell for $2 a pill. Distributors sell it for $10 to $15 a pill, and by the time a drug dealer sells it at a disco or on a college campus, it can fetch between $25 and $40. Thus, a $100,000 investment by an organized crime group can, in a matter of weeks, earn more than $5 million. Labs can manufacture some 100,000 tablets in a few days.
Manufacturing
Street “Ecstasy” could contain just about anything. It is generally manufactured in clandestine labs by criminal drug dealers, not chemists. Ecstasy usually comes in tablets, which have been found to contain anywhere from 0-50% MDMA. The most common non-MDMA ingredients in “Ecstasy” are aspirin, caffeine, and other over-the-counter medications.
One of the most dangerous additives commonly found in “Ecstasy” is DXM (dextromethorphan,) a cough suppressant. In the doses usually found in fake Ecstasy, 13 to 14 times the amount found in cough syrup, DXM can cause hallucinations. DXM inhibits sweating, so it can cause heatstroke and death. Another dangerous adulterant in so-called Ecstasy is PMA (paramethoxyamphetamine), an illegal drug that is a potent hallucinogen. Like MDMA, PMA causes an elevation in body temperature, but at an even more drastic rate.
Ecstasy tablets may be any color, and are generally embossed with a logo or design such as a butterfly, heart, lightning bolt, star, clover, or Zodiac sign. Ecstasy is sometimes found in powder or in capsules.
Though manufacturing ecstasy isn’t child’s play, most any serviceable chemist can make the drug, given the appropriate equipment and supplies. It’s much easier to produce than LSD, for example. The problem in the United States is that law enforcement tends to monitor the purchase of the precursor chemicals required to synthesize ecstasy. Chemical-supply companies often tip off the Drug Enforcement Administration when a customer purchases, say, an unusually large amount of isosafrole or MDP2P, two critical ingredients in ecstasy recipes. DEA agents sometimes pose as chemical salesmen in order to bust suspected ecstasy cooks. Such a sting operation led to the 2002 arrest of four New England men who were later indicted on charges of manufacturing tens of thousands of pills in a Connecticut trailer.
In view of this crucial situation for manufacturing, ecstasy is produced primarily in Dutch and Belgian labs-ranging from industrial-sized plants and mobile labs hidden inside trucks or on floating barges, to basements underneath farms and factories and more than 90 percent of the ecstasy in the U.S. comes from the Netherlands and Belgium. Drug labs have been found in barns, mobile homes, motel rooms, houseboats, mini-storage units, and basements of ordinary homes. Unlike real pharmaceutical laboratories, these labs have no guidelines for cleanliness or scientific procedures. Even if no adulterants are purposely added to the mix, any number of contaminants could enter the product due to the inadequate facilities and filthy conditions.
In the past year, about 50 labs were dismantled by police in Holland and Belgium, but they keep springing up in new locations, DEA agents in Belgium say. The massive production of ecstasy in Europe, particularly in and around the Dutch city Maastricht, is causing tensions between transatlantic law enforcement officials and policymakers. Experts say they do not expect production to fall soon despite attempts by the Dutch government to find and destroy the labs. Ecstasy manufacturers are now moving into Eastern Europe where precursor chemicals are easily available. Labs have recently been found in Poland, Bulgaria and Russia. The profits can be huge. According to the DEA, the initial investment needed for an ecstasy production lab can be less than 30,000. Each tablet costs between 10 and 20p to produce and in America can be sold for 30, several times more than in the UK.
Europe has become one of the biggest drug-producing regions in the world, according to new ecstasy seizure statistics from the US. The figures from the American Drugs Enforcement Administration reveal that more than 10 million ecstasy tablets were seized in the US last year, of which 80 per cent were manufactured in Europe.
The statistics reveal the boom in ecstasy production and export from Europe. In 2000, 27.5 million ecstasy tablets were among 10,000 kilos of drugs produced in Europe and seized overseas. In Europe 17m tablets were seized in 2000, 50 per cent more than in 1999.
In recent months there have been seizures of European ecstasy in Japan, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Mexico, Suriname and Brazil.
Distribution of Ecstasy
The most commonly heard estimate is that Israeli criminals control no less than 75 percent of the Ecstasy market in the U.S. According to a report issued in 2003 by the U.S. State Department, Israel is at the center of international trafficking in Ecstasy and Israeli crime organizations, some of them linked to similar organizations from Russia, achieved a dominant status in the Ecstasy market in Europe, and went on to control the drug’s distribution in the States. “Israeli drug-trafficking organizations are the main source of distribution of the drug to groups in the U.S, using express mail services, commercial airlines, and recently also using air cargo services,” the report states.
Packaged pills are sent overseas through a variety of methods. Air parcel companies, such as FedEx and UPS, are among the most popular. Israeli dispatchers will drive through Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg, stopping off to ship their packages, according to drug task force detectives in New York. “The Israelis are veterans. Some served in elite units and intelligence units,” said a New York narcotics agent. “They know all the tricks of surveillance and counter-surveillance. They are very hard to catch.” Law enforcement, however, is slowly denting this pipeline. On April 5, 2000, U.S. federal agents intercepted two 40-pound FedEx packages of Ecstasy that, according to the Boston Globe, had been shipped to hotel rooms in Boston and Brookline, Mass. The recipients, Yaniv Yona and Ereza Abutbul, were Israelis.
A few months later, U.S. Customs officials in Los Angeles seized Ecstasy shipments of 650,000 and 2.1 million tablets, respectively, on flights from Paris; agents in upstate New York seized 100,000 pills that had been transported across the St. Lawrence River from Canada. In 2000, DEA and Customs agents seized 11.1 million doses of the drug (up from a few hundred thousand in 1995). The United States also beefed up penalties a few months ago, tripling the potential jail terms for dealers caught with 800 or more pills to at least five years and three months; those caught with 8,000 or more would serve at least 10 years if convicted.
DEA agents and detectives say Israelis have been involved in almost all the major busts. They have included Sean Erez, currently awaiting extradition from the Netherlands; Shimon Levita, a New York yeshiva student who was sentenced to 30 months in a federal boot camp for participating in the ring allegedly run by Erez; and Jacob Orgad, identified as an Israeli national with operations in Texas, New York, Florida, California, and Paris. A man identified by Customs as head of one of the biggest “drug importation rings,” Israeli Tamer Adel Ibrahim, remains at large.
Trade Routes of Ecstasy
New York and Miami (with considerable Israeli populations) are major transit points for the drug. The Tel Aviv-to-Antwerp-to-Amsterdam-to-New York City route is a classic smuggler’s path, says a Belgian police officer. But with law enforcement lately scrutinizing arrivals at JFK and Newark airport more closely, Ecstasy distributors are now focusing on Los Angeles and the West Coast, where indigenous Israeli communities also exist and demand is high.
The Israeli Ecstasy rings have mainly used Israelis (sometimes unwittingly) as “mules,” or couriers, to bring the drug into the United States. Israeli nationals living in Europe and the United States, typically young and seeking some easy cash, make ideal couriers. They don’t fit the image of a Colombian cocaine smuggler and they don’t usually arrive en masse. Still, according to Dan Rospond, a DEA agent working in the Netherlands, “smuggling rings will often ’shotgun’ couriers on flights from Europe-either sending a bunch on the same flight or splitting them among several flights and airlines [to] the same destinations. If two or three are caught, half a dozen still get through.”
“Nobody suspects nice Jewish kids [of] being dope smugglers,” says a former NYPD detective in the Manhattan District Attorney’s office, “especially Orthodox Jews.”
Perhaps that’s why Erez used Orthodox and Hasidic Jews from the New York area to smuggle Ecstasy into New York’s major airports in 1999 and 2000. Young Hasidic couriers typically took 30,000 to 45,000 Ecstasy pills into the United States on each trip, according to a report by David Lefer in the New York Daily News, sometimes carrying as much as $500,000 in drug proceeds back to Erez, in Amsterdam. Offering $200 finder’s fees, the drug rings were able to infiltrate yeshivas and rabbinical seminaries, and recruit individuals who looked innocent enough to pass through customs without suspicion. In the insular Orthodox communities of Williamsburg, Brooklyn and Monsey, north of New York City, recruiters found gullible youngsters who thought they would be smuggling diamonds, not narcotics. The reach of the Israeli syndicate is truly global. In September 2000, Japanese police arrested Israeli David Biton on a charge of smuggling 25,000 Ecstasy tablets into Japan. “Ecstasy is to the new century what crack was to the 1980s,” said the DEA’s Rospond, and Israel has its finger on the trigger.
Although Israeli groups have dominated the Ecstasy trade for about a decade, profit margins are so enormous that organized crime groups from other countries are now attempting to muscle in on the market, an officer explains. “The Israelis are not about to allow the Albanians, the Serbs, the Poles, the Chechens, the Nigerians, the Dominicans, or even the Colombians to take away their profits,” says an undercover narcotics detective. “There will be violence. There will be bloodshed and we have to be ready.”
In Israel, and indeed around the world, a new day is dawning in the consumption and trafficking of a narcotic that resists control. And at New York’s JFK International Airport, a new day dawns for a small army of Immigration and Naturalization Service and Customs officers awaiting the arrival of El Al Flight 001-the first of many daily El Al flights from Israel. For years, customs agents paid little attention to El Al flights, but now, moments before 6 a.m., they are ready, waiting. They’ve got their work cut out for them.
“Pick the nice Jewish boy out of a crowd of nice Jewish boys,” says a veteran Customs inspector as he watches the 400-plus passengers search for their luggage. “It is the needle in the proverbial haystack.”
